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1 Introduction
According to van Fraassen (1980, 8, emphasis removed), scientifc realism is the
view that
[s]cience aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what
the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the
belief that it is true.
Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism does not differ from scientific realism in
its interpretation of scientific theories. They are interpreted literally and as ei-
ther true or false (van Fraassen 1980, 10). Rather, constructive empiricism claims
a different aim of science and a different condition of theory acceptance (van
Fraassen 1980, 12, emphasis removed):
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically
adequate.
The motivation for this position is that the truth of a theory is elusive. For
not only is the empirical adequacy of a theory but “indirect or partial evidence
for its truth” (van Fraassen 1980, 82; cf. 1989, 191), it is also the only evidence
possible. Explanation, for example, cannot provide “evidence for the truth of
a theory that goes beyond any evidence we have for its providing an adequate
description of the phenomena”, that is, beyond any evidence we have for its
empirical adequacy (van Fraassen 1980, 156–157, 154). There is, then, nothing
beyond empirical adequacy that could speak for a theory’s truth.
In an informal overview, van Fraassen (1980, 12) states that “a theory is em-
pirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events
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in this world, is true”, although he stresses that the notion of empirical adequacy
“will have to be spelt out very carefully if it is not to bite the dust among hack-
neyed objections” (van Fraassen 1980, 19). I will argue that van Fraassen has not
spelled out the notion of empirical adequacy carefully enough, for a theory may
be empirically adequate according to his definition even though it can be obser-
vationally determined that the theory is false.
2 Truth and empirical adequacy
Towards a precise definition of empirical adequacy, van Fraassen (1980, 64) sug-
gests describing theories in terms of model theory:
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models;
and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical
substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observ-
able phenomena.
Furthermore the models of the theory “are describable only up to structural
isomorphism” (van Fraassen 2008, 238; cf. 2002, 22). A formal paraphrase of van
Fraassen’s notion is given in definition 1. Realism now claims that science strives
for the truth of a theory, where a “theory is true if the real world itself is (or is
isomorphic to) one of [the theory’s] models” (van Fraassen 1989, 226).1
For the definition of empirical adequacy, van Fraassen (2008, 283) strictly
distinguishes between the phenomena and their appearances: “Phenomena are ob-
servable entities (objects, events, processes,. . . ) of any sort, appearances are the
contents of measurement outcomes”. And he suggests describing appearances by
structures: “The structures which can be described in experimental and measure-
ment reports we can call appearances” (van Fraassen 1980, 64; cf. 2008, 286). This
is paraphrased in definition 2. Van Fraassen (2008, 284) is careful to note that
each
appearance is determined jointly by the measurement set-up (involv-
ing both apparatus and the system to which it is applied), the experi-
mental practice, and the theoretical conceptual framework in which
the target and measurement procedure are classified, characterized,
and understood.
Thus even though the phenomena are objective, the appearances are in part de-
termined by the theory, specifically by its conceptual framework. Van Fraassen
assumes that the appearances are given not by a single structure, but a set of them,
which becomes explicit in his central definition of empirical adequacy: A “theory
is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic
1As is clear from the context, van Fraassen here substitutes ‘if’ for ‘if and only if’. The paren-
thetical remark is justified because the family of theories is closed under isomorphism.
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to empirical substructures of that model” (van Fraassen 1980, 64, my emphasis; cf.
1991, 12).2 To be empirically adequate, a theory thus has to have one specific
model with empirical substructures (plural) such that all appearances (plural)
are isomorphic to some of those substructures (see definition 3).
Since the phenomena are part of the world, the appearances have to be sub-
structures of the world’s structure. Thus even though the world is objective, the
structure of the world is determined also by the theory’s conceptual framework
and, as far as the appearances are concerned, by the features of the experiments.
In a sense the structure of the world mediates between the world and a theory
in the same way that the appearances mediate between the phenomena and a
theory’s empirical claims: The truth of a theory’s claims about the world is de-
termined by the relation of the theory’s models to the structure of the world,
and the truth of a theory’s claims about the phenomena is determined by the
relation of the theory’s empirical substructures to the appearances.
The definition of the truth of a theory involves a subtlety that is easily over-
looked: It is not enough for the truth of a theory that there is an isomorphism
from the structure of the world to one of the theory’s models. Additionally, the
isomorphism has to respect the appearances, that is, its restriction to the domain
of an appearance has to be an isomorphism between that appearance and an em-
pirical substructure of the model. Otherwise, there can be true theories that are
not empirically adequate (claim 1). Definition 4 of truth includes a paraphrase of
this condition.
3 To save constructive empiricism
Since the appearances are substructures of the structure of the world, a theory
can only be true if one of its models is isomorphic to an extension of all appear-
ances,3 and there’s the rub: The empirical adequacy of a theory does not ensure
that there is such an extension of the appearances. An even stronger claim can be
made: There can be theories that are empirically adequate and only make claims
about phenomena, but for which there is still no such extension (claim 2). This
is because for empirical adequacy it suffices that there is some model of the the-
ory so that for each appearance, there is some, any isomorphism to an empirical
substructure of that model. These isomorphisms can be chosen independently
from each other, and specifically, two isomorphisms may map two different ob-
jects of their respective domains to the same object in the domain of the model.
In such a case it can happen that there is no isomorphism between the structure
of the world and the model of the theory simply because there is no appropriate
bijection between their domains. In short, the problem is that van Fraassen’s def-
inition of empirical adequacy only demands that the relation of a theory to each
appearance is evaluated individually, even though considering all appearances to-
2Van Fraassen again substitutes ‘if’ for ‘if and only if’.
3A structureB is and extension of a structure A if and only if A is a substructure ofB.
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gether can reveal that a theory is false. This result does not even require that for
the truth of a theory, the isomorphism between the structure of the world and
the model of the theory must respect the appearances.
Constructive empiricism therefore is in trouble: According to van Fraassen
himself, the informal description of empirical adequacy is insufficient for avoid-
ing “hackneyed objections”, but his precise notion of empirical adequacy is not
in general “partial evidence” for a theory’s truth. It can on the contrary happen
that a theory that is empirically adequate is certainly false given the appearances.
Conversely, that a theory is not certainly false given the appearances can be es-
tablished by comparing the extensions of the appearances and the models of the
theory, and hence there can be evidence for a theory’s truth that goes beyond
evidence for its empirical adequacy. Science, then, should aim for more than em-
pirical adequacy.
It seems that to save constructive empiricism, van Fraassen’s definition of em-
pirical adequacy must be modified. A straightforward modification that ensures
that the isomorphisms between appearances and empirical substructures are not
independent anymore uses the notion of coordinated isomorphisms. The appear-
ances are coordinately isomorphic to some empirical substructures if and only if
there is a single bijection that, when restricted to the domain of an appearance,
is an isomorphism to an empirical substructure (cf. definition 5). With this no-
tion, it is easy to define a stricter notion of empirical adequacy: A theory is strictly
empirically adequate if and only if it has some model such that all appearances are co-
ordinately isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model (definition 6). Strict
empirical adequacy has a neat connection to truth, because a theory is true if
and only if it has some model such that all appearances and the world are coor-
dinately isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model and and the model
itself (claim 3). And unlike in the case of empirical adequacy, a theory is strictly
empirically adequate if and only if the theory is true in an extension of all appear-
ances (claim 4). It therefore holds generally that a model of a strictly empirically
adequate theory could be true, for all we can observe. Strict empirical adequacy is
hence indeed partial evidence for a theory’s truth and, in van Fraassen’s account,
is all the evidence one can have.
4 Conclusion
Since its conception, constructive empiricism has relied on the wrong relation
between theory and appearances. For van Fraassen’s definition of empirical ad-
equacy is incompatible with the central motivation of constructive empiricism:
that any theory whose claims about the phenomena are true could be true it-
self, and that there is nothing beyond the truth of these claims that can provide
evidence for the theory’s truth. But as with previous criticisms, constructive em-
piricism is resilient enough to be saved by an amendment (cf. Muller and van
Fraassen 2008). Constructive empiricism should be the claim that science aims to
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give us theories which are strictly empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory
involves as belief only that it is strictly empirically adequate. Since this amendment
is designed to recover the central motivation of constructive empiricism, most
discussions of this motivation can probably remain unchanged. But it remains to
be seen which discussions of empirical adequacy must be reevaluated.
Appendix: Definitions, claims, and proofs
Definition 1. A theory

{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N contains a family of structures (the
models of the theory) and for each structure Tn ,n ∈ N , a set En of empirical sub-
structures, such that for each E ∈ En , E ⊆ Tn . With each model, a theory also
contains every isomorphic structure and its corresponding4 empirical substruc-
tures.
In the following,


Tn ,En
 ..= 
{Tn}n∈N ,{En}n∈N and Tn ..= |Tn |.
Definition 2. The appearances are given by a set A of structures. A structure
A ∈A is an appearance.
Definition 3. A theory


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate for the set A of appear-
ances if and only if there is some n ∈N such that the structures in A are isomor-
phic to some structures in En .
Claim 1. There are a theory


Tn ,En

and a structure B of the world with appear-
ancesA such that


Tn ,En

is not empirically adequate givenA, butB is isomorphic
to some Tn ,n ∈N .
Proof. Let B = 〈{a, b , c},{a, c}〉 and A = {〈{a, b},{a}〉},5 where a, b , and c are
distinct objects. Let the theory be given by the family with the member T1 =〈{1,2,3},{1,2}〉 and the set of empirical substructures E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉}. Let
all other models of the theory be isomorphic to T1 and have the corresponding
empirical substructures. Since 〈{a, b},{a}〉 is not isomorphic to 〈{1,2},{1,2}〉,
the theory is not empirically adequate. ButB is isomorphic to T1.
Definition 4. A theory


Tn ,En

is true in structure B with appearances A if
and only if there are an n ∈ N and an isomorphism f from B to Tn such that
for any A ∈A, f |A :A−→ E is an isomorphism from A to some E ∈ En .
Claim 2. There are a theory


Tn ,En

with Tn =
⋃{E : E ∈ En} and appearances
A such that


Tn ,En

is empirically adequate givenA, but there is no extension of all
A ∈A that is isomorphic to some Tn ,n ∈N .
4 To be precise: If f : Tm −→ Tn is an isomorphism from Tm to Tn , then the set En of empirical
substructures that corresponds to Em contains all and only those structures E′ for which there is
an E ∈ Em such that f |E is an isomorphism from E to E′.
5As is customary, the first element of the tuple is the domain, the second a relation.
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Proof. Let the appearances be given by the set of the two structuresA= {〈{a, b},
{a, b}〉, 〈{c ,d},{c}〉}, where a, b , c , and d are distinct objects. Let the theory be
given by the family with the memberT1 = 〈{1,2,3,4},{1,2}〉 and the set of empir-
ical substructures E1 = {〈{1,2},{1,2}〉, 〈{2,3},{2}〉}. Let all other models of the
theory be isomorphic to T1 and have the corresponding empirical substructures.
Then the theory is empirically adequate. An isomorphism from T1 to a structure
with the two appearances as substructures would have to be a bijection from
{1,2,3,4} to {a, b , c ,d}, and thus the structure has to be 〈{a, b , c ,d},{a, b , c}〉.
But this structure is not isomorphic to T1.
Definition 5. The elements of a set A of structures are coordinately isomorphic
to the elements of a set E of structures if and only if there is a bijection i :⋃{A : A ∈ A} −→⋃{E : E ∈ E} such that for each A ∈ A, i |A : A−→ E is an
isomorphism from A to some E ∈ E and for each for each E ∈ E, i−1|E : E −→A
is an isomorphism from E to some A ∈ A. i is called a coordinating bijection
from the elements of A to the elements of E, and its restrictions i |A are called
coordinated isomorphisms.6
Definition 6. A theory


Tn ,En

is strictly empirically adequate for the set A of
all appearances if and only if there is some n ∈ N such that the structures in A
are coordinately isomorphic to some structures in En .
Claim 3. A theory


Tn ,En

is true in the structure B with appearances A if and
only if there is some n ∈ N such that the structures in {B} ∪A are coordinately
isomorphic to Tn and some structures in En .
Proof. Every isomorphism fromB to Tn that establishes a theory’s truth is also
a coordinating bijection from {B} ∪A to {Tn} ∪E∗n for some E∗n ⊆ En , and vice
versa.
Claim 4. A theory


Tn ,En

is strictly empirically adequate for the set A of appear-
ances if and only if there is an extensionB of all A ∈A such that 
Tn ,En is true in
B with appearances A.
Proof. For the inference from right to left, assume that the isomorphism f from
B to Tn establishes the theory’s truth. Let E∗n be the minimal set such that
f |A : A −→ E for some E ∈ E∗n . Then it follows straightforwardly from the
definition that f is a coordinating bijection from the elements of A to those of
E∗n .
For the inference from left to right, assume that there is a coordinating bi-
jection i from all appearances to the empirical substructures in E∗n ⊆ En of
Tn . For any two A,A′ ∈ A, then, the restrictions of their respective relations,
6Incidentally, it is straightforward to show that the empirical substructures in En correspond
to those in Em if and only if the isomorphism from Tm to Tn is a coordinating bijection from the
elements of Em to those of En (see note 4).
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functions, and constants to A∩A′ are identical. Thus there is a unique B˜ with
B˜ =
⋃{A :A ∈A} and A⊆ B˜ for all A ∈A.
Now define T′n as an expansion of Tn by the unary predicates PE interpreted
by E for each E ∈ E∗n , and define B˜′ analogously as an expansion of B˜ by the
unary predicates PA interpreted by A for each A ∈ A. It follows from the defi-
nition of coordinating bijection that i is an embedding of B˜′ in T′n . Therefore
there is an extension B′ of B˜′ and an isomorphism f from B′ to T′n (Hodges
1993, ex. 1.2.4b). By the definition of B˜′, the reduct B of B′ to the non-logical
constants of B˜ is an extension of B˜ and, since the substructure relation is tran-
sitive, also an extension of all A ∈A. Furthermore, by the definitions of B˜′ and
T′n , f is an isomorphism fromB to Tn such that for every A ∈A, f |A :A−→ E
is an isomorphism for some E ∈ En (namely those in E∗n ).
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